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NOTES 
Forever on the Installment Plan?  An 
Examination of the Constitutional 
History of the Copyright Clause and 
Whether the Copyright Term Extension 
Act of 1998 Squares with the Founders 
Intent 
Kevin D. Galbraith* 
INTRODUCTION 
According to the terms of our Constitution, Congress shall have 
the power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.1  That the 
founders chose to insert this clause at all seems remarkable, given the 
broad strokes with which they drafted the Constitution.2  Why would 
 
     * J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2002; B.A., Government, 
Connecticut College, 1992.  The author would like to thank Professor William Treanor, 
Fordham University School of Law, for helpful research guidance; Professor Martin 
Flaherty, Fordham University School of Law, for his insights on the uses of history in 
interpreting the Constitution, generously provided on an earlier version of this paper; Elise 
Clark for her careful and thorough editing; and his wife and family for their enthusiastic 
support. 
 1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  This is referred to alternately as the Copyright Clause or 
the Intellectual Property Clause.  As this Note looks at copyright specifically rather than 
intellectual property as a whole, which would include at least patents, and in some circles 
trade secrets and trademarks as well, I will use the former. 
 2 For example, courts and citizens have puzzled for over two hundred years over the 
meaning of expansive terms such as due process and cruel and unusual punishment.  
See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VIII, and XIV; Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 
(1997) (holding that the right to physician-assisted suicide was not a fundamental right 
protected by due process); Stewart v. LaGrand, 526 U.S. 115, 119 (1999) (holding that a 
death-row inmate had waived his claim that execution by lethal gas violated his Eighth 
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they take the time to confer a monopoly right in a text seeking to 
guide a newly free nation?  Monopolies, even limited ones, were 
anathema to late-eighteenth-century political sensibilities,3 and it is 
worth asking what tipped the scales in their favor when the founders 
attempted to balance cultural progress and the monopoly-like 
property rights granted by copyright. 
Contemporaneous accounts reveal that the Copyright Clause 
gained passage with neither debate nor dissent at the Federal 
Convention in Philadelphia.4  As a result, modern observers 
attempting to discern the original meaning of the Copyright Clause 
must look at other records.  These records include copyright statutes 
passed by various states at the urging of the Continental Congress, 
each characterized by the desire to promote cultural progress through 
securing literary rights to authors;5 the writings of Thomas Jefferson 
raised serious objections rooted in his strong distaste for 
monopoliesa distaste with a long colonial pedigree in multiple 
letters to James Madison;6 the writings of Madison, his Federalist 
advocacy for consolidated power here embodied in his strong 
support for national copyright protectionthis support is registered 
in his primary reference to the clause, contained in Federalist 43;7 
and the text of the Copyright Act of 17908 passed by the First 
Congress.  It is only upon a careful examination of these and other 
 
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment). 
 3 See Timothy R. Phillips, The Unconstitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension 
Act of 1998, Opposing Copyright Extension 2-6, 22-23 n.3 (detailing the various contexts in 
which the founders expressed their distaste for monopolies, including the fact that the trade-
restrictive Navigation Acts were among the grounds cited for declaring independence from 
England), at http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/OpposingCopyright Extension/ 
constitutionality/phillips02.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2002); see also FORREST MCDONALD, 
NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 17-18 (1985) 
(describing colonists arguably overblown fear of monopoly). 
 4 Irah Donner, The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Why did the Framers 
Include It with Unanimous Approval?, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 361 (1992); see also Edward 
Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Background and 
Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 1, 26-27 (1994). 
 5 See infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 6 See infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text. 
 7 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 239-40 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 8 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
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records that we can determine the value of history in assessing the 
constitutionality of the modern copyright regime. 
Since the ratification of the Constitution in 1789, Congress and our 
courts have granted steadily increasing protection to copyright 
holders.  This paper will discuss the following question: Do the 
protections granted under modern copyright law exceed the 
founders intent, or more specifically, does the Copyright Term 
Extension Act of 19989 (hereinafter CTEA) exceed the powers 
granted to Congress by the Copyright Clause?  Balancing the dual 
policies of encouraging creativity and protecting public access, this 
Note will explore whether the current state of copyright law is 
weighted too heavily in favor of copyright protection, defeating the 
founders intent by listing dangerously toward true monopoly, as 
many commentators have argued,10 and whether the history of the 
Copyright Clause provides enough evidence for modern observers to 
reach a well supported conclusion.11 
 
 9 Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). 
 10 Perhaps the most comprehensive and helpful conceptual framework for analyzing the 
constitutionality of copyright provisions has been developed by Paul J. Heald and Suzanna 
Sherry in their article, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property 
Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1167 (2000).  
They posit several principles that the Supreme Court must weigh if it is to remain true to the 
founders intent: 
When the Court addresses the constitutionality of statutes that might possibly 
run afoul of the Intellectual Property Clause, it is likely to allow Congress 
significant flexibility but only within the constraints of four principles of 
constitutional weight: 1. The Suspect Grant Principle: Scrutiny under the 
Intellectual Property Clause is only triggered when Congress effects a grant of 
exclusive rights that imposes monopoly-like costs on the public; 2. The Quid 
Pro Quo Principle: A suspect grant may only be made as part of a bargained-
for exchange with potential authors or inventors; 3. The Authorship Principle: 
A suspect grant must initially be made to either the true author of a writing or 
to the party responsible for a new advance in the useful arts; 4. The Public 
Domain Principle: A suspect grant may not significantly diminish access to 
the public domain. 
Heald and Sherry conclude that the CTEA, both in its prospective and retroactive 
applications, does not pass constitutional muster.  Id. at 1168-76.  Regardless of how one 
comes out in the application of these core principles, the framework remains valuable. 
 11 Regarding the uses and abuses of history at the hands of legal scholars, lawyers, and 
courts, see generally Martin S. Flaherty, History Lite in Modern American 
Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995) (persuasively arguing that constitutional 
discourse is replete with historical assertions that are at best deeply problematic and at 
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Part One begins in the present, focusing on the CTEA, including 
its policy rationales, its text, and Eldred v. Reno (hereinafter 
Eldred),12 the constitutional challenge to the CTEA that is now 
before the Supreme Court.13  While this suit was brought on both 
First Amendment and Copyright Clause grounds, this Note will focus 
on the latter, in which plaintiffs argue that the monopoly-like 
property rights represented by copyright have been unduly extended 
with no appreciable promotion of progress.  With the current case 
law on the table, Part Two steps back to place the Copyright Clause 
in historical context, looking at its predecessor in England, the 
Statute of Anne.14  This Part will also examine the contemporaneous 
late-eighteenth-century approaches to copyright protection, 
specifically the state copyright statutes adopted in the period between 
the Declaration of Independence and the Federal Convention, and the 
effectivenessor lack thereofof those statutes.15  After looking at 
the copyright protections granted in the time leading up to the 
Federal Convention, this Part will trace the Copyright Clause from 
introduction and adoption by the Federal Convention through 
ratification by the state ratifying conventions, including support 
rooted in the desires to grant increasing power to the national 
government and to promote cultural progress expressed by Madison,  
 
worst, howlers).  Id. at 525; EDWARD SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 
(2000) (providing a useful overview of copyright law through the ages). 
 12 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999), affd, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), rehearing en 
banc denied, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. granted, Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 70 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2002) (No. 01-618). 
 13 See Supreme Court to Intervene in Copyright Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 19, 
2002, available at 2002 WL 13778135; see also Openlaw: Eldred v. Ashcroft (a 
comprehensive website addressing the factual and legal developments of this case, 
maintained by the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School), at 
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft  (last visited Apr. 15, 2002); James 
Surowiecki, Righting Copywrongs, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 21, 2002 (describing the factual 
background to Eldred and spelling out some of Professor Lawrence Lessigs criticisms of 
the growing trend toward property-rights fundamentalism in the realm of intellectual 
property), available at http://www.newyorker.com/printable/?talk 
/020121ta_talk_surowiecki (last visited Apr. 15, 2002); see generally Opposing Copyright 
Extension (maintained by Professor Dennis S. Karjala of Arizona State University, this 
website contains well chosen links and documents central to the case), at 
http://www.law.asu.edu/ HomePages/Karjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/default.htm (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2002). 
 14 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710) (Eng.). 
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and strong objections grounded in the fear of monopolies lodged by 
Jefferson. 
Part Three will explore the terms of the Copyright Act of 1790,16 
passed by the First Congress.  The First Congress comprised many 
founders whose understanding of the power granted (to authors via 
the Congress) by the Copyright Clause may be helpful as modern 
observers attempt to discern the constitutional validity of expanding 
copyright protection.17  In addition, this Part will briefly review the 
ever-expanding terms of copyright protection contained in the 
Copyright Acts of 1831,18 1909,19 and 1976.20 
Both sides in Eldred have advanced historical arguments regarding 
the extent of Congresss power, the appropriate level of judicial 
deference to that power, and the promotion of progress that is 
expected to underlie any statutory copyright protection.  With the 
historical context provided by Parts Two and Three in mind, Part 
Four will evaluate these arguments in light of the evidence available.  
This Part will discuss both the arguments disposition by the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia, and the versions of those 
arguments now before the Supreme Court, as expressed in the briefs 
seeking and opposing a writ of certiorari, and in the amicus briefs 
filed to date.  This Note will conclude by assessing the usefulness of 
history in determining the constitutional validity of the CTEA, 
finding that while the CTEA is assailable on multiple appealing 
policy grounds, it is likely to survive any history-based constitutional 
scrutiny. 
 
 15 See infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 16 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
 17 See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57 (positing that the 
construction of the Constitution by those contemporary with its formation, many of whom 
were members of the convention which framed it, is of itself entitled to very great weight).  
This language is axiomatic, and both plaintiffs and defendants in Eldred point to it, albeit to 
advance very different arguments. 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999), affd, 239 F.3d 372 
(D.C. Cir. 2001), rehearing en banc denied, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 
2001), cert. granted, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 70 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2002) (No. 01-
618). 
 18 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1-2, 4 Stat. 436. 
 19 17 U.S.C. § 12 (1909) (repealed 1978). 
 20 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., 90 Stat. 2541 (2001). 
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I.  THE COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION ACT OF 1998 AND THE 
CHALLENGE TO ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY 
The First Congress, which included many founders, interpreting 
the Copyright Clause in the Copyright Act of 1790,21 chose a 
protection term of fourteen years, followed by an equal renewal term, 
resulting in a maximum duration of twenty-eight years.  By 1978, 
when the Copyright Act of 197622 went into effect, the term of 
copyright had been radically expanded to life plus fifty years, so that 
if an author wrote a book at age thirty, and lived until she was 
seventy, the term of protection would be ninety years.  As if that was 
not difficult enough to square with the founders intent when they 
wrote for limited times, next came the CTEA,23 extending the 
copyright term to life plus seventy years, bringing the total length of 
exclusive rights in the above example to 110 years, eighty-two years 
longer than the term the First Congress thought was required to 
promote progress.24 
The primary rationale given for this latest extension was 
harmonizing U.S. law with that of the European Union, 25 which, in 
 
 21 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
 22 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., 90 Stat. 2541 (2001). 
 23 Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). 
 24 Despite the striking disparity between the fourteen-year term contained in the 1790 
Act and the life-plus-seventy-years term in the CTEA, proponents nevertheless advanced a 
demographic argument in justifying the extension, writing that it merely modifies the 
length of protection in nominal terms to reflect the scientific and demographic changes that 
have rendered the life-plus-[fifty] term insufficient to meet [the aim of protecting the author 
and at least one generation of heirs].  S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 11 (1998). 
 25 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-452 (1998); see also S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 3 (1998) (stating 
that the twenty-year extension will provide significant trade benefits by substantially 
harmonizing U.S. copyright law to that of the European Union).  This rationale has been 
widely criticized by commentators arguing that 1) the CTEA does not achieve 
harmonization with European Union law, and 2) even if it had, such a goal does not change 
the fact that it is unconstitutional.  See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, The Duration of Copyright and 
the Limits of Cultural Policy, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 625, 639 (1996) (pointing out 
that uniformity with respect to the term of copyright protection remains an unrealistic goal 
even as between the United States and the European Union, which otherwise share a 
common concern for high levels of protection for cultural goods. When the rest of the world 
is factored into the calculus, the goals of greater uniformity and harmonization than that 
which occurred under the TRIPS Agreement become chimerical, indeed.); S. REP. NO. 
104-315, at 31-32 (1998) (containing the remarks of Senator Hank Brown (R-CO), in which 
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1995, extended the copyright term of its member states to life plus 
seventy years.26  Other rationales cited were: providing additional 
incentive for authors to create new works; providing additional 
incentive for holders of existing copyrights to restore older works 
and further disseminate them to the public;27 and allowing authors to 
pass the financial benefits of their creativity on to their children and 
grandchildren.28  The extension of the term, its application to existing 
copyrights, and the rationales given by Congress, are analyzed both 
below and in Part Four. 
 
he states, We are not a member of the European Union.  The European Union does not 
determine our treaty obligations.  Senator Brown goes on to point out that this bill does 
not harmonize the American concept of copyrights with that of European countries, and if 
we passed this bill, we would be further distancing our laws from EU laws, not harmonizing 
them.); Heald & Sherry, supra note 10, at 1171 (arguing that [t]he desire to cooperate 
with the international community may be a worthy goal, but it is not a blanket justification 
for passing otherwise unconstitutional legislation, and drawing the comic analogy that 
granting Heineken the exclusive right to brew beer in the United States might help our 
relations with Holland, but Congress could not make such a grant.); Marci A. Hamilton, 
Copyright Duration Extension and the Dark Heart of Copyright, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 655, 660 (1996) (taking a somewhat more hard-line position that the seemingly amoral 
goal of international standardization is in fact a shield behind which less public-spirited 
interests may seek their own ends.). 
 26 Council Directive 93/98, 1993 O.J. (L 290/9) (cited in S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 10 
(1998)). 
 27 See S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 3 (1998) (stating that by stimulating the creation of new 
works and providing enhanced economic incentives to preserve existing works, the twenty-
year extension will enhance the long-term volume, vitality, and accessibility of the public 
domain.).  These arguments, particularly regarding the extensions effect on the public 
domain, have been hotly contested.  See Brief of Amici Curiae American Association of 
Law Libraries et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft (2001) (No. 01-618) (containing a chart representing 
Professor Peter Jaszis understanding of the deleterious effects of repeated copyright term 
extensions on the growth rate of the public domain). 
 28 H.R. REP. NO. 105-452, at 4 (1998) (listing among the purposes of the term extension 
the fact that [a]uthors will be able to pass along to their children and grandchildren the 
financial benefits of their works).  This justification also came under fire from Senate 
Judiciary Committee member Senator Herb Kohl (D-WI).  See S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 38 
(1998) (advancing his argument in terms more charitable than those used by more vitriolic 
critics: Congress has recognized the legitimate need and desire of an artist to leave a legacy 
to his heirs.  However, it is not and cannot be a first order justification for the twenty-year 
extension.  Of course, some of the people who would benefit from this measurelike the 
heirs of the American composers whose copyrights are about to expireare decent and 
hardworking.  But just because they are decent people does not mean that they should 
continue to receive royalties for an extra [twenty] years for work they did not create and at 
the expense of the American consumer.). 
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A. Eldred v. Reno 
To date, opponents of the CTEA have mounted one serious 
challenge to its constitutionality.  In Eldred,29 multiple plaintiffs 
argued on several grounds that the CTEA violated the Constitution.  
For purposes of this Note, I will focus on their claims that the statute 
violated the for limited times portion of the Copyright Clause, 
leaving aside the First Amendment and public trust doctrine 
arguments. 
Plaintiffs were several individuals and corporations, each of which 
use, copy, reprint, perform, enhance, restore or sell works of art, 
film, or literature in the public domain.30  They had prepared to use 
works created before 1923, relying on the fact that they would have 
entered the public domain had it not been for the CTEA, which 
prevented them from legally copying, distributing, or performing 
these works by virtue of its retroactive term extension.31 
1. The District Court 
The district court begins with the text of the Copyright Clause, 
then briefly details the rights and terms provided by the Copyright 
Act of 1790, noting that Congress has since repeatedly revised and 
extended these exclusive rights for limited times.32  After spelling 
out the plaintiffs objections, the court summarily dismisses them, 
citing authorities for what it holds to be three dispositive 
propositions: 1) Congress defines the scope of the grants of 
copyrights to authors . . . under its copyright clause power;33          
 
 29 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) [hereinafter Eldred I]. 
 30 Id. at 2; see generally Daren Fonda, Copyright Crusader, THE BOSTON GLOBE 
MAGAZINE, Aug. 29, 1999 (containing helpful background information on Eric Eldreds 
web-based electronic library comprised largely of public domain works, and on the genesis 
of this lawsuit), available at http://www.boston.com/globe/magazine/8-
29/featurestory1.shtml (last visited Apr. 15, 2002); see also Eldritch Press, at 
http://www.eldritchpress.org (last visited Apr. 15, 2002). 
 31 Eldred I, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 2. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 3 (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)).  
Here, the Court asserts in a footnote that the introductory language of the copyright clause 
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2) The limited times period is subject to the discretion of 
Congress;34 and 3) Congress has authority to enact retrospective 
laws under the copyright clause.35  With these three precedents to 
gird its ruling, the court concludes that the CTEAs extension of 
limited times is within the discretion of Congress36 and grants 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant. 
2. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia,37 advancing the same arguments with the same result.38  
At the appellate level, however, both the majority and the dissent 
make extensive historical arguments in reaching their respective 
conclusions. 
Early in the opinion, Judge Ginsburg, writing for the majority, 
acknowledges that the CTEA applies retrospectively in the sense 
that it extends the terms of subsisting copyrights.39  The court notes 
that this is not unusual in the U.S. copyright regime, however, and 
traces the history of U.S. copyright law from the Copyright Act of 
179040  through  the  Copyright Act of 197641  to underscore its point  
 
does not limit Congresss power in this realm, citing Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 
112 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  Id. at n.6.  With this conclusion, the court takes the step required to 
decide this case in defendants favor without inquiring as to whether Congress has 
adequately emphasized the promotion of science and useful arts when enacting the CTEA. 
 34 Id. (citing Pennock & Sellers v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 16-17 (1829)). 
 35 Id. (citing McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202, 206 (1843)).  Here, the court 
drops a footnote stating, [w]ithin the discretion of Congress, any fixed term is a limited 
time because it is not perpetual.  If a limited time is extended for a limited time then it 
remains a limited time.  Id. at n.7.  With this statement the court appears to insulate any 
future statutory extension of the copyright term from constitutional challenge, provided it 
does not grant an infinite term. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Eldred II]. 
 38 Id. at 373. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Act of May 31, 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 124. 
 41 Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 302-05, 90 Stat. 2541, 2572-76 (1976) (codified as amended 
at 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.). 
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that retroactivity of term extension has not been seen as 
objectionable since the earliest days of copyright protection.42 
The court then explains that the plaintiffs challenge the 
constitutionality of the CTEA because, in extending the term of 
subsisting copyrights, the CTEA violates the limited times 
requirement of the Copyright Clausea requirement that they say is 
informed by the goal of promot[ing] the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.43  After providing this background, the court states 
what must be the starting point for any discussion of the limited 
times provision of the Copyright Clause: If the Congress were to 
make copyright protection permanent, then it surely would exceed 
the power conferred upon it by the Copyright Clause.44 
The court describes the plaintiffs position as follows: The 
present plaintiffs want a limit well short of the rule against 
perpetuities, of course.  And they claim to have found itor at least 
a bar to extending the life of a subsisting copyrightin the preamble 
of the Copyright Clause: The Congress shall have power . . . To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.45  The court 
further explains the plaintiffs argument: Their idea is that the 
phrase limited Times should be interpreted not literally but as 
reaching only as far as is justified by the preambular statement of 
purpose: If 50 years are enough to promote . . . Progress, then a 
grant of 70 years is unconstitutional.46  The court quickly dismisses 
this argument, pointing to its precedent in Schnapper v. Foley47 
where it rejected the argument that the introductory language of the 
Copyright Clause constitutes a limit on congressional power.48 
As the bulk of the majority opinion directly confronts arguments 
advanced by the dissent, I will go through those arguments       
before  turning  to  the  majoritys counterarguments.  Judge Sentelle,  
 
 42 Eldred II, 239 F.3d at 374. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 377. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 377-78. 
 47 667 F.2d 102 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 48 Eldred II, 239 F.3d at 378 (citing Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 112 (1981)). 
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dissenting in part, writes that the CTEAs twenty-year extension of 
copyright terms for existing works violates the Constitution. 
Judge Sentelle begins by analogizing the case before the Court to 
United States v. Lopez,49 where the Supreme Court invalidated the 
Gun-Free School Zones Act,50 holding that the Act exceeded the 
outer limits of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause.  
Judge Sentelle reasons that it is apparent that this concept of outer 
limits to enumerated powers applies not only to the Commerce 
Clause but to all the enumerated powers, including the Copyright 
Clause.51  The dissent looks at the Copyright Clause as a whole: 
The clause is not an open grant of power to secure exclusive rights.  
It is a grant of a power to promote progress.52 
Building upon that view, the dissent points out that while the 
majority acknowledges that [i]f the Congress were to make 
copyright protection permanent, then it surely would exceed the 
power conferred upon it by the Copyright Clause,53 it argues that 
there is no apparent substantive distinction between permanent 
protection and permanently available authority to extend originally 
limited protection.54  Fleshing out this thought, the dissent 
extrapolates from the majoritys holding: The Congress that can 
extend the protection of an existing work from 100 years to 120 
years, can extend that protection from 120 years to 140; and from 
140 to 200; and from 200 to 300; and in effect can accomplish 
 
 49 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 50 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1990) (forbidding any individual knowingly to possess a 
firearm at a place that [he] knows . . . is a school zone). 
 51 Eldred II, 239 F.3d at 381 (emphasis in original).  Plaintiffs have seized on Judge 
Sentelles invocation of Lopez, one of the originalists most powerful invocations of history 
used to strike down legislation as beyond the Constitutions grant of power, illustrating that 
conservatives do not have a monopoly on originalism.  See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 
at 5, 7, Eldred v. Ashcroft (2001) (No. 01-618); see also Horowitz, Is Congress Mickey 
Mouse-ing with Copyrights?, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 11, 2002 (quoting lead counsel and 
Stanford Law Professor Lawrence Lessig: This is truly one of those unique cases where the 
issues are not political.  This is about interpreting the original intent of the Constitution.), 
available at http://www.law.com (last visited Mar. 6, 2002). 
 52 Eldred II, 239 F.3d at 381. 
 53 Id. at 381-82. 
 54 Id. at 382. 
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precisely what the majority admits it cannot do directly.55  
Returning to its Lopez analogy, the dissent contends that this type of 
unrestrained exercise of Congressional power exceeds the proper 
understanding of enumerated powers reflected in the Lopez principle 
of requiring some definable stopping point.56 
Combining textual and historical rhetoric, the dissent carries the 
point further: Returning to the language of the clause itself, it is 
impossible that the [f]ramers of the Constitution contemplated 
permanent protection, either directly obtained or attained through the 
guise of progressive extension of existing copyrights,57 for the 
simple reason that [e]xtending existing copyrights is not promoting 
useful arts, nor is it securing exclusivity for a limited time.58 
Next the dissent turns to the majoritys reliance on Schnapper, 
arguing that case should be read narrowly: Though, under 
Schnapper, we may not require that each use of a copyright 
protection promote science and the arts, we can require that the 
exercise of power under which those applications occur meet the 
language of the clause which grants the Congress the power to enact 
the statute in the first place.  This the [CTEA] does not do.59  
Following this reasoning, the dissent concludes that it is not within 
the enumerated power.60 
 
 55 Id.  Seeking support for their arguments that the CTEA was originally intended to 
extend the copyright protection term beyond constitutional limits, commentators have 
(somewhat gleefully) pointed to the remarks of Representative Mary Bono (R-CA): 
Actually, [the late] Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright protection to last forever.  I 
am informed by staff that such a change would violate the Constitution.  I invite all of you 
to work with me to strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us.  As you 
know, there is also Jack Valentis proposal for the term to last forever less one day.  Perhaps 
the Committee may look at that next Congress.  144 CONG. REC. H9946, 9952 (daily ed. 
Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Bono).  See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsberg, Wendy J. Gordon, 
Arthur R. Miller & William F. Patry, Symposium, The Constitutionality of Copyright Term 
Extension: How Long Is Too Long?, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 652 (then-
Professor Patry referring to the above statement). 
 56 Eldred II, 239 F.3d at 382. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 383. 
 60 Id. 
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Finally, the dissent critiques the majoritys historical claims 
regarding the Copyright Act of 1790: The enactment by the [F]irst 
Congress in 1790 regularizing the state of copyright law with respect 
to works protected by state acts preexisting the Constitution 
appears . . . to be sui generis.61  Here, Judge Sentelle points out 
what he sees as the logical flaw in the majoritys reliance on the 
initial federal copyright statute: Necessarily, something had to be 
done to begin the operation of federal law under the new federal 
Constitution.  [The Copyright Act of 1790] created the first . . . 
federal copyright protection; it did not extend subsisting federal 
copyrights enacted pursuant to the Constitution.62 
In its opinion, the court addresses the dissents criticisms squarely.  
While maintaining that Congresss power to grant copyright 
protection is not encumbered by the promot[ing] progress 
language, the majority argues that even if it were, the CTEA would 
satisfy that requirement.  For support, the court points to Congresss 
finding that extending the duration of copyrights on existing works 
would . . . give copyright holders an incentive to preserve older 
works, particularly motion pictures in need of restoration.63 
Next, the court mounts a textual and historical attack on the 
dissents objection to this extension of copyright term protection: 
The dissent identifies nothing in text or in history that suggests that 
a term of years for a copyright is not a limited [t]ime if it may later 
be extended for another limited [t]ime.64  Having found the dissent 
lacking either textual or historical support, the court continues, 
Instead, the dissent suggests that the Congressor rather, many 
successive Congressesmight in effect confer a perpetual copyright 
by stringing together an unlimited number of limited [t]imes, 
although that clearly is not the situation before us.65 
 
 61 Eldred II, 239 F.3d at 384. 
 62 Id. (emphasis in original, citations omitted).  The dissent, however, ignores the fact 
that later term extensions were written to apply to existing copyrights as well. 
 63 Id. at 379 (citing S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 12 (1996)). 
 64 Eldred II, 239 F.3d at 379. 
 65 Id. (pointing to the claim that the CTEA matches U.S. copyrights to the terms of 
copyrights found in the European Union, a motivation the dissent finds irrelevant, as 
members of the European Union are not bound in their intellectual property laws by the U.S. 
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The court goes on to take a somewhat expansive view of 
promot[ing] progress as directed by the preambular language of 
the Copyright Clause: As for the dissents objection that extending a 
subsisting copyright does nothing to promote [p]rogress, we think 
that implies a rather crabbed view of progress: Preserving access to 
works that would otherwise disappearnot enter the public domain 
but disappearpromotes [p]rogress as surely as does stimulating 
the creation of new works.66 
Pointing out what it sees as another vulnerability in the dissents 
historical position, the court argues that [t]he position of our 
dissenting colleague is made all the more difficult because the First 
Congress made the Copyright Act of 1790 applicable to subsisting 
copyrights arising under the copyright laws of the several states.67  
Here, the court fails to respond to the dissents critique of its logic, 
where the dissent writes that the fact that the Copyright Act of 1790 
extended subsisting copyrights will not support an historical 
argument because it was the first federal copyright legislation, and as 
such, contained sui generis protection for those works previously 
covered only by state laws.68 
Nevertheless, the majority bolsters its historical position by citing 
authority for the proposition that the work of the First Congress 
should be carefully considered when deciding constitutional 
questions: The construction of the Constitution by [those] 
 
Constitution).  Id. at 384. 
 66 Eldred II, 239 F.3d at 379 (advancing the argument that without extended copyright 
protection, those who currently control the rights to these works would have no financial 
incentive to make them available, and that therefore the works would languish and be lost to 
the public). 
 67 Id. (citing Act of May 31, 1790, §§ 1, 3, 1 Stat. 124-25, and further pointing to the 
fact that later Congressesin 1831, 1909, 1976, and 2000extending the copyright term 
did so for both subsisting and prospective copyrights).  The inference drawn by the majority 
has been disputed by commentators.  See, e.g., Heald & Sherry, supra note 10, at 1151-52 
(pointing to multiple reasons for retroactive copyright protection present in 1790, namely 
confusion over common-law copyright, lack of uniformity among the states under the 
Articles of Confederation, and arguing that the retrospective term extension of 1831 should 
be seen as an isolated incident, coming more than forty years after the first copyright act 
and not repeated for another seventy-seven years, and is more indicative of congressional 
reticence than of congressional assertion of authority.) (citations omitted). 
 68 Eldred II, 239 F.3d at 384. 
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contemporary with its formation, many of whom were members of 
the convention which framed it, is of itself entitled to very great 
weight, and when it is remembered that the rights thus established 
have not been disputed [for this long], it is almost conclusive.69  In 
dismissing plaintiffs attempts to avoid this conclusion by arguing 
that the extension of subsisting state copyrights under the 1790 act 
was simply a routine application of the Supremacy Clause, the court 
reminds plaintiffs that [a] federal law is not valid, let alone 
supreme, if it is not first an exercise of an enumerated power.70  
Having prevented the plaintiffs from distinguishing a long line of 
cases giving great weight to the work of the First Congress, the court 
finds that just as the First Congress was clearly secure in its power 
under the Copyright Clause to extend the terms of subsisting 
copyrights beyond those granted by the states, so too was the 
Congress when it enacted the CTEA. 
Finally, the court follows a different course than that suggested by 
the dissent when it looks to United States v. Lopez,71 instead pointing 
to cases where the Supreme court defers to Congress: Within the 
realm of copyright, the Court . . . has been . . . deferential to the 
judgment of the Congress.  As the text of the Constitution makes 
plain, it is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the 
scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to authors . . . 
in order to give the appropriate public access to their work 
product.72  The court concludes by applying a rational relationship 
test (sometimes known as a rational basis test) and affirming the 
district courts ruling upholding validity of the CTEA, asserting that 
[t]h[e] evolution of the duration of copyright protection tellingly 
illustrates the difficulties Congress faces [in exercising its copyright 
power]. . . .  [I]t is not our role to alter the delicate balance Congress 
has labored to achieve.73 
 
 69 Id. at 379 (citing Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57 (1884)). 
 70 Eldred II, 239 F.3d at 379. 
 71 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (exerting aggressive judicial review where Congress pushed, and 
in the Courts opinion exceeded, the outer limits of the Commerce Clause). 
 72 Eldred II, 239 F.3d at 380 (quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417, 429 (1984), one of the seminal modern copyright cases). 
 73 Eldred II, 239 F.3d at 380 (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990)). 
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Following the ruling of the court of appeals, plaintiffs petitioned 
for rehearing and filed a suggestion for rehearing en banc.  On a 7-2 
vote, the court denied the petition,74 with both the majority and the 
dissent advancing the same arguments, in abbreviated form, as they 
had earlier. 
II.  HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
A. The English Predecessor to U.S. Copyright Law 
In order to more thoughtfully analyze the constitutional validity of 
the CTEA, it is necessary to place copyright in historical context.  
When the founders assembled and considered including copyright 
protection as a part of the new federal Constitution, they were 
primarily influenced by copyright practice in England.75  While 
copyright custom and practice in England dated back to as early as 
1518, following the introduction of printing in 1476, not until 1710 
was it codified.76  That was the year that the bill that became the 
Statute of Anne77 was introduced.  The original bill was entitled A 
Bill for the Encouragement of Learning and for securing the property 
of Copies of Books to the rightful Owners therof.78  The language 
of the bill created significant controversy for two reasons: first, that it 
implied with the word securing that a property right preexisted, 
and second, that it contained no term limitation.79 
After vigorous debate, the name of the bill was changed to A Bill 
for the Encouragement of Learning by Vesting the Copies of Printed 
Books in the Authors, or Purchasers, of such Copies, during the 
Times therein Mentioned, and contained protection terms of 
fourteen years for new books, twenty-one years for existing books, 
 
 74 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 75 Edward C. Walterscheid, Defining the Patent and Copyright Term: Term Limits and 
the Intellectual Property Clause, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 315, 320 (2000). 
 76 Id. at 331-34. 
 77 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710) (Eng.). 
 78 Walterscheid, supra note 75, at 334. 
 79 Id. 
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and provided for a renewal period of fourteen years if the author was 
still living at the expiration of the initial term.80  These term limits 
were the result of considerable concern expressed during debate in 
the House of Commons, where critics objected that a perpetual 
copyright would result in a the type of unrestricted monopoly and 
restraint of trade that was to be avoided at all costs.81  These 
objections would be echoed later in the writings of Jefferson and 
others, and in the plaintiffs arguments in Eldred.  Nonetheless, with 
minor grammatical changes, this bill was adopted and codified as the 
Statute of Anne. 
The Statute of Anne remained uninterpreted by the courts until 
1769, when Millar v. Taylor concluded, largely on natural rights and 
labor theory grounds, that copyright rested with authors as a matter 
of common law, irrespective of the Statute of Annes term limitation 
provisions.82  Just five years later, however, in Donaldson v. Becket, 
the House of Lords decided that whatever may have been the case 
originally at common law, the Statute of Anne effectively limited the 
term for which copyright could be enforced at common law to a 
maximum of twenty-eight years.83  While commentators have 
questioned the grounds on which Donaldson v. Becket was decided,84 
it remained good law during the period when copyright protection 
was first being discussed in the newly formed United States, and was 
the backdrop against which the merits, purposes, and potential 
pitfalls of copyright were analyzed. 
 
 80 Id. at 334-35.  A mystery remains as to the origins of the stated purpose of the bill, 
the encouragement of learning.  Legal historians disagree, but what is clear is that this 
purpose was soon embraced by Parliament and later by the framers of our Constitution.  Id. 
at 335-36. 
 81 Id. at 334.  As will be discussed later, this discomfort with open-ended monopolies 
has surfaced every time copyright termsor in the case of Thomas Jefferson, the inclusion 
of a Copyright Clause at allare debated. 
 82 Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769). 
 83 Walterscheid, supra note 75, at 340 (discussing Donaldson v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408 
(1774)). 
 84 Walterscheid, supra note 75, at 340-41 (describing the theoretical questions raised by 
scholars both at the time of the decision and since). 
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B. Pre-Constitutional U.S. Predecessors to the Copyright Clause 
In the period between the Declaration of Independence and the 
Federal Convention, while the political theories that would later be 
memorialized in the Constitution were evolving, copyright protection 
was a creature of the states.  This lack of a national copyright regime 
was the result of the fact that the Continental Congress had very little 
centralized power, with the bulk of authority being reserved to its 
constituent states.85 
In March of 1783, the Continental Congress formed a committee 
to consider the most proper means of cherishing genius and useful 
arts through the United States by securing to the authors or 
publishers of new books their property in such works.86  In May of 
the same year, the committee issued its report, concluding nothing 
is more properly a mans own than the fruit of his study, and that the 
protection and security of literary property would greatly tend to 
encourage genius.87  At the committees recommendation, the 
Continental Congress passed an act to encourage all the states 
(because it could not bind them) to pass copyright legislation 
protecting the rights of authors, and eleven of the thirteen states did 
so, with only Delaware declining.88  The Continental Congress 
 
 85 Id. at 347; see also William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System: 
Protecting the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907, 911 (1997) (discussing the 
Continental Congresss approach to encouraging the states to enact copyright protections). 
 86 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 180 (1783), quoted in Patry, supra 
note 85, at 911.  This committee included James Madison, whose writings on the merits of 
copyright protection in Federalist 43 will be discussed later. 
 87 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 326 (1783), quoted in Patry, supra 
note 85, at 911. 
 88 Patry, supra note 85, at 911-12.  At the time of this Resolution, Connecticut had 
already passed state copyright legislation.  An interesting sidelight to the development of 
state copyright laws is the active role played by Noah Webster in securing support of many 
influential framers.  Seeking state copyright protection for his new school textbook on the 
English language, Webster became what we would today call a lobbyist, traveling from 
Pennsylvania to New Jersey, on to Connecticut and New York, and finally to Virginia, 
Maryland, and Delaware, converting to his cause, among others, James Madison and George 
Washington.  See Donner, supra note 4, at 370-71. 
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suggested that an appropriate term would be at least fourteen years, 
with an additional renewal term of at least fourteen years if the 
author survived the initial term.89 
As the purposes of copyright protection are critical to the later 
discussion of the validity of the CTEA under the Copyright Clause, it 
is instructive to look at the stated purposes of these state copyright 
statutes.  The New Hampshire preamble is representative: 
As the improvement of knowledge, the progress of 
civilization, and the advancement of human happiness, 
greatly depend on the efforts of ingenious persons in the 
various arts and sciences; as the principal encouragement 
such persons can have to make great and beneficial 
exertions of this nature, must consist in the legal security 
of the fruits of their study and industry to themselves; and 
as such security is one of the natural rights of all men, 
there being no property more peculiarly a mans own than 
that which is produced by the labor of his mind.  
Therefore, to encourage the publication of literary 
productions, honorary and beneficial to the public.90 
Between 1783 and 1787, the shortcomings of the copyright laws 
adopted by the states at the urging of the Continental Congress 
became apparent.  The primary weakness of the regime was the 
simple fact that one states laws had no effect in another state, so 
authors wishing to protect their rights on a national basis were forced 
to expend a great deal of time and energy traveling to the several 
states to procure protection in each one.91  This objection was best 
stated by James Madison, who wrote in April 1787 that the states 
were want of concert in matters where common interest requires it, 
 
 89 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 326-27 (1783), quoted in 
Walterscheid, supra note 75, at 347-48. 
 90 Act of Nov. 7, 1783, ch. 1, 1783, 4th Sess., N.H. Laws (Vol. 4, at 521), quoted in 
Patry, supra note 85, at 912.  This preamble is virtually identical to those of the 
Massachusetts and Rhode Island statutes.  See Waltersheid, supra note 75, at 350.  This 
public benefit rationale lends support to the arguments of those who have challenged 
copyright term extensions, though defenders of the extensions have also argued that the 
extensions serve the public good as well, illustrating the malleability of policy declarations. 
 91 Donner, supra note 4, at 374. 
FRMT5.GLBRTH 5/17/02  3:11 PM 
1138 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 12 
 
a critique made in reference to a number of matters, including the 
laws concerning . . . literary property.92  This problem was typical 
of the time under the Continental Congress, as various states with 
disparate interests struggled to protect those interests with little 
regard for the benefits of the nation as a whole, and with little ability 
to promote any common interests even if they had so desired.  As the 
Federal Convention approached, the states favored copyright 
protection for authors.  Widespread dissatisfaction with the 
disjointed system in place under the Articles of Confederation made 
clear the need for a national law.93  The time was ripe for the 
inclusion of the Copyright Clause. 
C. The Copyright Clause from Introduction to Ratification 
Underlying the question of whether to provide for copyright 
protection in the Constitution was the more fundamental debate over 
how much power it was safe to grant to the central government, and 
which branch could be trusted with that power.  The Federalists, 
leery of the growing injustices perpetrated by state legislatures in the 
name of the people,94 argued vehemently that if the peoples rights 
were to truly be safeguarded, it would be through a carefully crafted 
national government consisting of three equal branches.  They had 
watched in horror as a majoritarian tyranny evolved, something 
previously thought impossible.  These Federalists, many authors 
among them, were eager to establish the new nation as a cultural 
 
 92 Department of State, Bureau of Rolls and Library, IV DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1786-1870 (1894-1905) 128, quoted 
in Donner, supra note 4, at 374. 
 93 See LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 192 (1968); see 
also Karl Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17 
GEO. L.J. 109, 112-13 (1929) (discussing Madisons statement and his general sensitivity to 
the need for federal copyright protection). 
 94 See MCDONALD, supra note 3, at 155-57 (discussing the rampant abuses visited on 
loyalists by state government in the post-Revolutionary period); see also Martin S. Flaherty, 
The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1727 (1996) (pointing to James 
Madisons recounting of Americans experiences under the remote, grasping English 
Parliament and under the Articles of Confederation: The legislative department, he wrote, 
is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous 
vortex.) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961)). 
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force in the international arena.95 The Anti-Federalists, on the other 
hand, argued vainly for robust states rights and a relatively weak 
central government, vested with only enough power to provide the 
services for which it was uniquely equipped, e.g., the common 
defense.  While they, too, saw the importance of literature and 
learning in the life of a nation, their means of achieving such policy 
goals was to reserve power to the states,96 ever fearful of power 
concentrated in the hands of a distant few as they thought back to the 
abusive and overreaching English Parliament whose grasping ways 
precipitated the Declaration of Independence. 
At the time of the Convention, while there was grumbling about a 
voracious central government swallowing power, more prevalent was 
the feeling that without a national government adequately 
empowered, the new nation would be in real trouble, just a decade 
after its birth.  However, among those who supported an increasingly 
centralized government, namely Federalist leaders and influential 
citizens, there was great distrust of the legislative branchseen as 
the most dangerous branch.97  As a result, if the new Constitution 
did not contain an explicit grant of Congressional power to promote 
progress by securing copyright protection, Congress would not be 
authorized to pass any laws in the area of literary property.98 
When the Copyright Clause was presented to the Constitutional 
Convention on September 5, 1787, there was no recorded debate, and 
the Clause was unanimously approved.99  This clear need for 
Congressional authorization, coupled with the relative scarcity of 
typical sources of divining the founders intent in adopting a 
 
 95 Donner, supra note 4, at 362. 
 96 See MCDONALD, supra note 3, at 269-70 (discussing the controversies that arose 
when express limitations on state powers were suggested in the context of militias). 
 97 See Flaherty, supra note 94 (discussing this perception). 
 98 See Donner, supra note 4, at 364-65. 
 99 Id. at 361; see also Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of the Useful 
Arts: The Background and origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States 
Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 26-27 (1994) (taking issue with the conventional 
wisdom that unanimous approval without debate indicates universal approbation, instead 
suggesting that those circumstances might simply indicate that the delegates were tired, 
wanted to go home, and simply did not perceive this particular grant of power to the 
Congress to warrant any further debate, regardless of whether they considered it to have any 
particular significance.). 
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provision unanimously, leads observers to examine alternate sources 
that might shed light on the meaning of the Copyright Clause, and 
the context of its adoption. 
James Madison of the Virginia delegation kept the most detailed 
notes recording the proceedings of the Convention, and from those 
records it appears that the first proposals for a Copyright Clause were 
presented on August 18, 1787.100  There is some question as to who 
deserves credit for originating the Clause, as both Madison and 
Charles C. Pinckney of South Carolina submitted for consideration 
by the Committee of Detail provisions for copyright protection.101  
Madisons proposed Congressional powers included the power to 
secure  to  literary  authors  their  copy  rights  for  a limited time.102  
Pinckney proposed the power to secure to authors exclusive rights 
for a certain time.103 
On September 5, 1787, after consideration of the suggested 
provisions, the Committee of Eleven reported back with the 
following language: To promote the progress of Science and useful 
arts by securing for limited times to authors & inventors the 
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.104  On 
September 12, the Committee of Stile and Arrangement reported to 
the full Convention the entire Constitution, which contained the 
Copyright Clause with the language unchanged from the September 
5 version.105   On September 17,  the Constitution  was  adopted  and  
 
 100 Fenning, supra note 93, at 112-13. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 112 (citing DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION (House 
Document No. 398, 1927), at 563 et seq.). 
 103 Id. (citing DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION (House 
Document No. 398, 1927), at 563 et seq.).  Clearly these proposals were nearly identical in 
both purpose and phrasing, so with the possible exception of Madisons and Pinckneys 
descendants, the unresolved question of who should be given more credit merits little 
interest.  As Fenning writes, It seems impossible to fix definitely on whose brow the laurel 
wreath should be placed . . . [b]ut there will probably be no great injustice in giving glory to 
both Pinckney and Madison.  Id. at 117. 
 104 Id. at 113 (citing DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION (House 
Document No. 398, 1927), at 666). 
 105 Id. at 114, (citing DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION 
(House Document No. 398, 1927), at 706, 745.). 
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signed by the delegates, and there was no recorded debate of the 
Copyright Clause.106 
There was some discussion regarding the Copyright Clause during 
the state ratifying conventions, most notably in Pennsylvania and 
North Carolina, where strong statements of support were made, 
pointing to its virtues in preventing piracy of literary works and 
defending it from George Masons attacks on the Constitution for 
lacking protection of the values that would later be embodied in the 
First Amendment.107  Beyond the words of these Federalist boosters, 
however, the most significant piece of evidence regarding the intent 
of the founders comes from Madison, who wrote: 
A power to promote the progress of science and useful 
arts by securing, for a limited time, to authors and 
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings 
and discoveries.  The utility of this power will scarcely 
be questioned.  The copyright of authors has been 
solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right of 
common law. . . .  The public good fully coincides . . . 
with the claims of individuals.  The States cannot 
 
 106 Donner, supra note 4, at 361. 
 107 Id. at 376-77.  At the Pennsylvania ratification convention, Thomas McKean, Chief 
Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, drafter of the Articles of Confederation, and 
former President of the Continental Congress, phrased his support this way: 
[T]he power of securing to authors . . . the exclusive right to their writings . . . 
could only with effect be exercised by the Congress.  For, sir, the laws of the 
respective states could only operate within their respective boundaries, and 
therefore, a work which has cost the author his whole life to complete, when 
published in one state, however it might be secured, could easily be carried 
into another state in which a republication would be accompanied with neither 
penalty nor punishmenta circumstance manifestly injurious to the author in 
particular. 
Id. (quoting II THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 415 
(J. Kaminski & G. Saladino ed., 1984)).  In North Carolina, James Iridell, an enthusiastic 
supporter of the Constitution, responded to George Masons well publicized objections in 
part by declaring that the future Congress will have . . . authority . . . to secure to authors 
for a limited time the exclusive privilege of publishing their works.  This authority has long 
been exercised in England, . . . and . . . such encouragement may give birth to many 
excellent writings which would otherwise have never appeared.  Id. (quoting Marcus IV, 
Norfolk and Portsmouth Journal, XVI THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 382 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino ed., 1984)). 
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separately make effectual provision for either [copyrights 
or patents], and most of them have anticipated the 
decision of this point by laws passed at the instance of 
Congress.108 
While Madison appears to ignore the House of Lords holding in 
Donaldson v. Becket that copyright was a matter governed by statute 
rather than common law,109 the positive, somewhat conclusory 
language of his statement both encapsulates the accepted need for 
federal copyright protection and illustrates the relative lack of 
controversy surrounding this provision. 
The idea of promoting progress and vaulting the United States into 
a place of honor on the world stage was appealing to a new and 
ambitious nation, and was embraced by Federalists trying to make 
their case for a strong national government.  While the goals 
sentiment was admired almost universally, the means of its 
implementation was not without dispute.  Some objections to the 
Constitution generally, and to the Copyright Clause implicitly, were 
grounded on the fear of monopolies, especially government-
sanctioned monopolies.  Such fears traced their roots back to, among 
others, the printing monopolies granted by the crown in England.110  
George Mason in Virginia, along with the members of ratifying 
conventions in New York, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and 
North Carolina, all expressed reservations.  With some variation in 
phrasing, they all conditioned their approval on the addition of 
explicit restrictions on Congresss power to grant monopolies.111  
These  reservations  point  up the sensitivity felt by the founders, and  
 
 108 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 239-40 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 109 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L. 1774). 
 110 See MCDONALD, supra note 3, at 17-18 (arguing that Americans fear of monopolies 
was based largely upon prejudice, lacking an understanding of how limited monopolies 
helped certain industries get off the ground in England); id. at 77 (describing monopolies as 
among what republican ideologues thought of as indicators of corruption and decay; others 
included standing armies, priests, bishops, aristocrats, luxury, excises, speculators, jobbers, 
paper shufflers . . . bloodsuckers, and monocrats). 
 111 Walterscheid, supra note 99, at 55-56 (citing Objections of the Hon. George Mason, 
2 AMERICAN MUSEUM OR REPOSITORY OF ANCIENT AND MODERN FUGITIVE PIECES, ETC. 536 
(1965); Ratification of the New Constitution, 4 AMERICAN MUSEUM 156; Remarks on the 
Amendments to the Federal Constitution, 6 AMERICAN MUSEUM 303). 
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go a long way toward explaining why the Copyright Clause includes 
the limited times language.112 
Thomas Jefferson, while not a member of the Federal Convention, 
was indisputably a force to be reckoned with when it came to 
theories and practicalities of governance.  He harbored a deep 
mistrust of monopolies, a mistrust shared by many, and strenuously 
articulated his opposition to them, specifically to those he saw being 
embraced in the Copyright Clause.  In December 1787, upon 
receiving a draft of the Constitution, Jefferson wrote to Madison 
expressing his general approval, but lodging his objection that it did 
not contain a bill of rights.113  The bill of rights advocated by 
Jefferson should provide clearly and without the aid of sophism . . . 
for the restriction against monopolies.114  Amplifying his belief, 
Jefferson later wrote, [I]t is better . . . to abolish . . . Monopolies, in 
all cases, than not to do it in any. . . .  The saying there shall be no 
monopolies lessens the incitements to ingenuity, which is spurred on 
by the hope of a monopoly for a limited time, as of 14 years; but the 
benefit even of limited monopolies is too doubtful to be opposed to 
that of their general suppression.115  The most concrete 
recommendation Jefferson made in his correspondence with Madison 
contained the following suggested alteration to the Constitutions 
language: Monopolies may be allowed to persons for their own 
productions in literature . . . for a term not exceedingyears, but for 
no longer term and for no longer purpose.116  Here we find the most 
direct contemporary call for a specific term limitation of copyright 
protection, and supporters of later term extensions might point to this 
 
 112 Id. at 56. 
 113 Id. at 55 (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), as 
quoted in P.J. Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 PAT. OFF. SOCY 237, 240 
(1936)). 
 114 Id. (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), as 
quoted in P.J. Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 PAT. OFF. SOCY 237, 240 
(1936)). 
 115 Id. at 55 (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in 
13 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1788, 440, 442-43 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1956)). 
 116 Edward C. Walterscheid, Inherent or Created Rights: Early Views on the Intellectual 
Property Clause, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, n.53 (1995) (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson 
to James Madison (Aug. 1789) in 5 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (P.L. Ford ed., 
1895)). 
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as a clear indication that this view was rejected implicitly when the 
Constitution, and later the Bill of Rights, were ratified with no such 
provision. 
Responding to Jeffersons forceful objections, Madison did not 
take issue with Jeffersons characterization of monopolies as an evil 
to be avoided.117  To have done so would have been to swim against 
the forceful tide of political and economic opinion.  Rather, he made 
the case that an exception should be made in the case of what we 
now know as intellectual property: With regard to Monopolies they 
are justly classed among the greatest nuisances in Government.  But 
is it clear that as encouragements to literary works . . . they are not 
too valuable to be wholly renounced?118  Here, Madison tries to 
defuse the power of Jeffersons objections by falling back on the 
promot[ing] progress rationale embraced since the Statute of 
Anne,119 and foreshadows the debate that has dogged copyright term 
extensions up until todaydoes granting additional protection 
somehow benefit the public by creating incentives for genius? 
III. THE COPYRIGHT ACTS OF 1790, 1831, 1909, AND 1976 
Empowered by the newly ratified Constitution, the First Congress 
quickly passed the Copyright Act of 1790, which adhered closely to 
its model, Englands Statute of Anne, in both form and substance.120  
 
 117 Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the Copyright 
and Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45, 57 (2000) (citing Letter from James Madison 
to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 13 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1788-1789, 
at 17 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1956)). 
 118 Id. 
 119 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710) (Eng.). 
 120 Id.  Commentators have argued that the CTEA invites increased judicial scrutiny and 
demands close examination in an historical light because not only does it not comport with 
the Copyright Clause, but also because it is inconsistent with its model, the Statute of Anne.  
See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 25, at 659: 
The British Statute of Anne, the precursor to the American Copyright Clause, 
was adopted for the purpose of reducing the monopoly power of the 
publishing industry and decentralizing that power by placing it in the hands of 
individual authors.  The marketing and concomitant lobbying power of the 
copyright industries, and their repeated victories at the expense of individual 
authors (most particularly in the work-made-for-hire context) is a clarion call 
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It granted an initial copyright protection term of fourteen years, and 
provided for a renewal term of fourteen years if the author was still 
living at the expiration of the initial term.121  Concerned by the 
greater protection received by foreign authors than by Americans,122 
Congress in 1831 lengthened the initial term to twenty-eight years, 
keeping the renewal term at fourteen years.123  In 1909, Congress 
rejected suggestions that it adopt a copyright term based on the life 
of the author, and instead expanded the renewal term to twenty-eight 
years, resulting in a total term of fifty-six years, provided the author 
survived the initial term and complied with filing formalities.124  In 
1976, Congress undertook the first major revision of the copyright 
regime in over sixty years, and after intense, decades-long lobbying, 
decided finally to base the protection term on the life of the author, 
settling on the term of life plus fifty years.125 
The rationales provided for the extensions of the copyright term 
between 1790 and 1976 have varied, but with the exception of the 
1831 extension, each has at least paid lip service to the constitutional 
purpose of promot[ing] progress.  As a result, whatever one 
thought of the merits of the ever-increasing terms of copyright 
protection, they were effectively protected from constitutional attack 
in this arena where Congress was explicitly acting within its 
enumerated powers. 
IV.  HISTORICAL ARGUMENTS IN ELDRED 
With the historical context provided by Parts Two and Three in 
 
to the Court to read the Copyright Clause with fresh attention and historical 
understanding. 
 121 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
 122 7 Cong. Deb. App. CXIX-CXX (1830) (remarks of Representative Ellsworth), cited 
in Patry, supra note 85, at 917.  Of course, this argument is echoed in the legislative history 
of the CTEA.  See S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 3 (1998) (stating that the CTEA will provide 
significant trade benefits by substantially harmonizing U.S. copyright law to that of the 
European Union). 
 123 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16 §§ 1-2, 4 Stat. 436. 
 124 17 U.S.C. § 12 (1909) (repealed 1978). 
 125 Pub. L. No. 94-553 §§ 302-305, 90 Stat. 2541, 2572-76 (1976) (codified as amended 
at 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.). 
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mind, this Part evaluates the historical claims made in Eldred in light 
of the evidence available, discussing the arguments disposition by 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 
 The majority appears to be on firmer historical ground than the 
dissent.  The majority, in affirming the constitutionality of the 
CTEA, has a strong textual argument that the phrase for limited 
times, without more, does not tie the hands of Congress if it 
determines that the existing term of copyright protection is not 
adequate to promote progress.  It reasons in a straightforward 
manner that simply adding one limited time to an existing limited 
time does not somehow make the resulting term something other 
than a limited time.126  The deferential tack taken by the majority 
signals an embrace of consolidated federal power, specifically that 
vested in the Congressa move that would make Federalists smile 
and Anti-Federalists cringe were they alive today.127 
 Further, the majority has over 200 years of precedent on its side, 
significantly starting with the Copyright Act of 1790, which granted 
copyright protection to existing works.128  Several extensions of the 
copyright term that followed, from the 1831 Act and the 1909 Act 
 
 126 See Eldred II, 239 F.3d 372, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  Opponents of the CTEA decry 
what they see as Congresss attempt to circumvent the Copyright Clauses limited times 
restriction.  See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8-9, Eldred v. Ashcroft, (2001) (No. 01-
618) (Under the authority of this case, Congress can now continue the practice of 
extending the term of subsisting copyrights without limit.  It can thus achieve a perpetual 
copyright term on the installment plan.) (quoting Statement of Professor Peter Jaszi, The 
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995, Hearings on S.483 Before the Senate Judiciary 
Comm., 104th Cong. (1995), available at 1995 WL 10524355, at *6). 
 127 Plaintiffs, of course, advocate a more active role for judicial review in the arena of 
copyright.  See Brief of Amici Curiae of Copyright Law Professors in Support of the 
Petition at 4, Eldred v. Ashcroft  (2001) (No. 01-618) (It is well-settled that the 
[c]onstitutional language conferring a power on Congress constrains the scope of that 
power.).  The brief invokes no less an authority for this proposition than Justice Marshalls 
opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803): The powers of the 
legislature are defined and limited; and . . . those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, 
the [C]onstitution is written.  Id.  These arguments are bolstered by an appeal to the Court 
to halt the copyright regimes slide down the slippery slope characterized by eleven term 
extensions in the past forty years, and capped by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2863 (1998), (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 
1201) (prohibiting circumvention of technological protections of works without carving out 
a fair use privilege).  See supra Brief of Amici Curiae, at 7-8. 
 128 See Eldred II, 239 F.3d at 374. 
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through the 1976 Act, made their extensions effective 
retrospectively.129  Any argument to the contrary that is purportedly 
based on history and custom, therefore, faces an uphill battle.130 
The majority rests its construction of the Copyright Clause on 
Schnapper, which appears to be wrongly decided in that it advances 
a tortured reading of the text, holding that the introductory language 
of the Copyright Clause [does not] constitute a limit on congressional 
power.131  This reading is difficult to support in that it seems to 
labor to construe individually parts of a sentence that should be read 
as a whole.  Nevertheless, even putting aside its reliance on 
Schnapper, the majority is on solid footing when it decides that the 
CTEA does not exceed the limits placed on Congressional power by 
the preambular language of the Copyright Clause, since it is 
Congress, not the judiciary, that is left to determine the appropriate 
term required to promote progress.  If it decides that the historical 
fear of monopolies and monopoly-like rights is overblown and 
should be put aside in favor of expanding copyright protection, that 
decision appears largely insulated from scrutiny. 
The dissent presents an appealing policy-based criticism of the 
CTEA, one that resonates at a core level with those who, like 
Jefferson, have an elemental abhorrence of government-sanctioned 
monopolies.132  However, when we look at the rejection of 
Jeffersons plea that the Constitution contain a specific term limit on 
copyright protection,133 it becomes clear that the founders chose 
another course, one that allowed monopolies in the realm of 
copyright because theyand subsequent Congressesthought the 
public benefits would outweigh the costs.  Whether that has played 
out or not is a question better handled by scholars and 
 
 129 See Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 14-15, Eldred v. Ashcroft (2001) (No. 
01-618) (emphasizing historical practice to refute the supposition that granting term 
extensions to existing copyrights is a per se violation of the Copyright Clause). 
 130 However, see Heald & Sherry, supra note 10, at 1151-52 (advancing the argument 
that these retrospective extensions were so few and far between prior to the twentieth 
century that in terms of historical practice, they should be seen as the exceptions rather than 
the rule). 
 131 Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 132 See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text. 
 133 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
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commentators134 than by courts.  And more important for this 
discussion, the policy determination of the proper term of protection 
is a matter better settled by Congress than by the judiciary. 
CONCLUSION: THE USEFULNESS OF HISTORY 
History is quite a helpful guide in determining whether the CTEA 
is consistent with the Copyright Clause.  Despite the lack of debate at 
the Federal Convention over its contents, we have a substantial body 
of evidence on which to draw when seeking to shed light on the 
founders intent.  This evidence includes English precedent, 
primarily the Statue of Anne,135 which was hugely influential on the 
policies, on the text, and even on the specific term of copyright 
protectionfourteen yearscontained in the Copyright Act of 
1790.136  Beyond that, we have the writings of participants in the 
Pennsylvania and North Carolina ratifying conventions, registering 
their strong support for the ideas that federal copyright law was 
desirable and that it needed to be authorized by the Constitution, 
implicitly shunting aside the dual fears of monopoly and grasping 
national power.137 
Next we have Madisons Federalist 43 in which he asserts the 
unquestioned benefits of copyright protection that would be 
manifested in cultural progress.138  We know, in fact, that these 
benefits were far from unquestioned, however, by looking at the 
exchanges between Jefferson and Madison on the subject of 
monopolies in general and in the realm of copyright specifically.139  
 
 134 See generally SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY (2001) (arguing that the 
entire modern copyright regimes bent toward property-rights fundamentalism is 
inconsistent with the founders intent); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: 
THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001) (warning that the richness and 
variety of publicly accessible creative materials is shrinking, perhaps irretrievably, as a 
result of current conceptions of intellectual property). 
 135 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710) (Eng.). 
 136 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 
 137 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 138 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 239-40 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 139 See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text. 
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Nonetheless, the founders felt that the cultural benefits derived from 
securing exclusive rights to authors more than counterbalanced the 
temporary costs to the public posed by the monopoly.   
It is with this historical record that the Supreme Court is left to 
determine the constitutionality of the CTEA,140 and while a more 
robust historical record would be welcome, it is of course not 
forthcoming.  What we have is enough, in my opinion, to say with 
some degree of confidence that the CTEA, despite valid and 
appealing policy objections, passes constitutional muster under the 
Copyright Clause. 
 
 
 140 As is common with pending cases, observers will be tempted to guess at the Justices 
likely positions.  For example, many will point to then-Professor Stephen Breyers article, 
The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and 
Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970), in which he argues that the copyright 
regime may be overprotective, frustrating the founders attempts to balance public access 
and the reward to creators.  However, extrapolating from writings produced in a different 
context, and in this case more than thirty years ago, is always a dicey business.  Here, it is 
made even more risky given the complex factual background and multiple constitutional 
considerations at play. 
